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AI Summary:
Source: “Humankind’s innovation challenge can be understood in terms of an ‘ingenuity gap’ between the increasing seriousness of the world’s problems and the lagging supply of solutions to those problems. Homer-Dixon (1995, 2000) defines ‘ingenuity’ as sets of instructions that people use to arrange the things in their world (including materials and other people) to solve their problems. As our world’s problems become harder, our requirement for ingenuity— measured by the length and complexity of the sets of instructions we need to address our problems—rises. Too often now, it seems, we cannot supply this required ingenuity. Indeed, it can be argued that our current institutional arrangements, including the institutional pressures and incentives (governance regimes, market incentives, and cultural values) that attract and shape the emergence of both technical and social innovation, mediate against an appropriate and creative response to complex challenges…
Commoner (1993) pointed out that the ‘technosphere,’ the innovative engine that has driven the modern economy, is organized along lines very different from and even contrary to the functioning of the ‘bio-sphere.’ Commoner summarizes four points of contrast: (1) the cyclical nature of ecological processes versus the linear, means-end reasoning that characterizes the techno-sphere; (2) the biosphere represents a dynamic equilibrium in the exchange of matter and energy, destruction, and creation versus the technosphere’s orientation toward profit maximization through the externalization of environmental and social costs; (3) in the biosphere, parts are fundamentally interdependent versus the technosphere, where single variable interventions without reference to system impacts and interactions are the rule rather than the exception; (4) elements of the biosphere by nature evolve in relation to each other to achieve system integrity versus the idea that growth of separate parts, irrespective of the system, is a good and limitless possibility (Commoner 1993, pp. 8–13). The introduction of the automobile, greeted as an extraordinary innovation, is often cited as an example of failure to consider the possible system consequences of a single technology…
Three inter-related levels are identified: regimes, landscapes, and niches (Geels and Schot 2007; Markard and Truffer 2008). Regimes are the dominant rule-sets supported by incumbent social networks and organizations and embedded in dominant artifacts and prevailing infrastructures, of say, particular industries or social problem arenas. Landscapes provide the environment in which regimes evolve. They consist of features like the geographical position of the land, climate, and available resources, and ‘softer’ features like political constellations, economic cycles, and broad societal trends. Landscape factors are a major source of selection pressure on dominant regimes, and so, as landscapes shift, so do the possibilities for innovation and scaling-up of innovations. Radical innovation originates in niches: small protected spaces in which new practice can develop, protected from harsh selection criteria and resistance from prevailing regimes. Transitions (changes from one stable regime to another) are conceptualized in the model as occurring when landscape pressures destabilize prevailing regimes, providing breakthrough opportunities for promising niches. This implies a non-linear process of change in which, after passing critical thresholds, elements of a previously dominant regime recombine with successful niches into a new dynamically stable configuration (Rotmans and Loorbach 2009…
All this points to the need for ‘adaptive governance’ in situations, such as ecosystem-based management that require integrated management approaches (Dietz et al. 2003; Folke et al. 2005). The more successful adaptive governance systems, often emergent and self-organizing, connect individuals, networks, organizations, agencies, and institutions at multiple organizational levels with ecosystem dynamics (Folke et al. 2005; Bodin and Crona 2009; Berkes 2010). It is important to stress that transparent, and inclusive decision-making processes that are viewed as legitimate by stakeholders, are a precondition for effective adaptive governance systems to emerge and be sustained over time despite social and ecological uncertainty and surprise. This is in line with the findings of scholars in transition management (e.g., Grin et al. 2010; Loorbach 2010) who argue that the ability to coordinate experiments that contribute to system innovation is of crucial importance in releasing lock-ins and enabling shifts to new trajectories. Such ‘systemic experiments’ should broadly focus on broadening the diversity of options, ideas, organizational settings, and practices (see for example Bormann and Kiester 2004; Rudd 2004). In other words, building resilience requires systemic experimentation and innovation and this in turn requires enabling those closest to the problem to shape and define solutions…
Institutional entrepreneurs and their networks may work simultaneously at building innovation niches into innovation regimes and at destabilizing the dominant landscape and regime to secure the required resources. At the broader institutional or landscape level, they act to ‘nibble’ at the resilience of the dominant system, seeking opportunities in the market, the political/policy sphere and the cultural sphere, where resources can be redirected to the emerging innovation niche/regime and where elements supportive of the new regime can be inserted (see Fig. 4). Meanwhile, they nurture innovative alternatives, through sensemaking, building, and brokering partnerships between unusual suspects, selling the innovations to secure resources and creating disturbances in existing regimes and landscapes (Westley 2002; Olsson et al. 2004; Westley et al. 2006). In this context, scholars have focused on the role of shadow networks, informal networks that work both outside and within the dominant system to develop alternatives that can potentially replace the dominant regime if and when the right opportunity occurs (Gunderson 1999; Olsson et al. 2006; Westley and Vredenburg 1997). Shadow networks are incubators for new ideas and approaches, for example for governing and managing social-ecological systems.”
Source: The Three Horizons of innovation and culture change
Source: “Global environmental change requires responses that involve marked or qualitative changes in individuals, institutions, societies, and cultures. Yet, while there has been considerable effort to develop theory about such processes, there has been limited research on practices for facilitating transformative change. We present a novel pathways approach called Three Horizons that helps participants work with complex and intractable problems and uncertain futures. The approach is important for helping groups work with uncertainty while also generating agency in ways not always addressed by existing futures approaches. We explain how the approach uses a simple framework for structured and guided dialogue around different patterns of change by using examples. We then discuss some of the key characteristics of the practice that facilitators and participants have found to be useful. This includes (1) providing a simple structure for working with complexity, (2) helping develop future consciousness (an awareness of the future potential in the present moment), (3) helping distinguish between incremental and transformative change, (4) making explicit the processes of power and patterns of renewal, (5) enabling the exploration of how to manage transitions, and (6) providing a framework for dialogue among actors with different mindsets. The complementarity of Three Horizons to other approaches (e.g., scenario planning, dilemma thinking) is then discussed. Overall, we highlight that there is a need for much greater attention to researching practices of transformation in ways that bridge different kinds of knowledge, including episteme and phronesis. Achieving this will itself require changes to contemporary systems of knowledge production. The practice of Three Horizons could be a useful way to explore how such transformations in knowledge production and use could be achieved.”
Image source: “In summary, the futures-oriented version of the model, shown in Figure 1, comprises: 1) '1st Horizon': the current prevailing system as it continues into the future, which loses ‘fit’ over time as its external environment changes; 2) '3rd Horizon' ideas or arguments about the future of the system which are, at best, marginal in the present, but which over time may have the potential to displace the world of the first horizon, because they represent a more effective response to the changes in the external environment. Although the diagram suggests there is only one such '3rd horizon', in practice, especially in the early stages, there will be several, or many, 3rd horizon arguments being articulated. This is explored later in the paper. 3) 2nd Horizon; an intermediate space in which the first and third horizons collide. This is a space of transition which is typically unstable. It is characterised by clashes of values in which competing alternative paths to the future are proposed by actors…
Horizon 1, at least in the affluent world, is a world in which fossil fuel sources are dominant, in terms of consumption, production, and distribution infrastructure. It is also generally centralised. The prevailing consumption model is that energy is ‘always on’; continuous power is supplied to whoever wants it and can afford it. This prevailing system is falling away because of concern over carbon emissions and resource shortages. Horizon 3 advocates propose, generally, the production of energy from renewable energy sources; some also advocate more local or decentralised energy systems; there are some who propose reduced consumption. Some link high levels of energy use explicitly to degradation of eco-systems and biodiversity. Emerging technologies (such as combined heat and power) are championed; different energy-based business models are tried (for example service-based energy companies). Other Horizon 3 actors point to hydrogen-based energy futures; some to an energy future based on nuclear fission. In these cases, ‘weak signals’ for Horizon 3, or ‘pockets of the future embedded in the present’ can be seen, for example, in green critiques of energy policy; in the increasing use of wind turbines on new sites; in the UK's ‘Transition Towns’ movement; in the emergence of new energy businesses; and in continuing research into solar, fission, and other energy technologies. Horizon 2, then, becomes a space of both conflicts and options. There are some options in which the technologies espoused by Horizon 3 advocates are given significant public (and fiscal) support, as has happened to a significant extent in Germany. There are options around approaches to demand reduction, whether through changes in values and behaviour, or changes in energy management systems. Other options represent responses of the prevailing energy industry to those factors which are identified as challenging the current Horizon 1 model. These might include 'cleaning' existing energy supply technologies (such as 'carbon capture and storage') or investment in existing technologies which are regarded as clean (such as nuclear power). In some areas, though generally no longer in energy, Horizon 1 actors can simply contradict (or ignore) the frame, or frames, being used by Horizon 3 actors as the basis for advocating change…
Broadly, the 3rd horizon will cover the period over which the significant elements of a system can be changed. For energy security, which involves significant infrastructure issues, the 3rd Horizon period is likely to be about 50 years away… the model has been used more extensively across a range of futures problems, by a number of practitioners. In the course of this work, its range of application has been extended. It has been used to connect visions to drivers analysis, and to test policy options, challenges, and path dependency in emerging futures analysis… It is worth underlining the extent to which such transitions are inherently both messy and non-linear. In response to the failing system in Horizon 1, different groups will advocate different developments, and there will be different experiments, informed by different assessments of risk, cost, performance, and social and political values. Some ideas fail, despite having substantial resources expended on them. A new prevailing system does emerge from this complex process, but it is impossible to predict the eventual shape of this system. These are essentially processes of political, social, and public negotiation, occurring within complex adaptive systems.”
Source: “Current societies cannot stay the same forever in the face of the strength of global forces like climate change. The question is thus not whether to change, but how system transitions and transformational change can be stewarded towards different kinds of futures. Using a simple heuristic called Three Horizons, this paper explores the dynamics of four common archetypes of system transition and transformation: Smooth Transitions, Capture and Extension, Collapse and Renewal, and Investment Bubbles. Smooth Transitions are relatively rare. The others are much more pervasive, tend to delay transition, and often produce undesirable effects. Understanding the dynamics and causes of the different archetypes generates six critical lessons for stewarding transformations. These are the need to: 1) Maintain transformational intent; 2) Navigate all archetypes simultaneously; 3) Attend to an interplay of three different patterns of innovation (sustaining, disruptive, transforming); 4) Work with three mindsets and orientations to the future (manager, entrepreneur, and visionary); 5) Establish four active modes of governance; and 6) Actively build capacities for transformational stewardship. The archetypes confirm others' findings that systemic conditions are critical in shaping opportunities for effective leadership. Yet they also suggest that how such conditions arise is partly determined by the way transformation is understood as a qualitatively distinct form of change and the availability of transformational approaches to leadership. To more rapidly advance understanding of how to steward system transition, research needs greater focus on marrying insights from larger scale system change studies with insights from those attempting to steward change on the ground and in practice.”
Source: “This paper makes a contribution to the identified need for conceptual clarity and new theory on social innovation. Specifically it addresses transformative social innovation (TSI), defined as the process of challenging, altering, or replacing the dominance of existing institutions in a specific social and material context. Social innovation initiatives and networks are understood as the key collective actors that instigate TSI processes. They do not all start out with transformative ambitions however. Of those that do, only a few eventually achieve transformative impacts; indeed there are many risks of capture and co-option along the way. A relational framing is presented as the most suitable way to theorise the emergent and multiply embedded nature of SI initiatives interacting with changing institutions, where organizational and institutional boundaries are often fluid and under negotiation. To develop middle-range theoretical insights on TSI, we conducted an empirical study of 20 transnational social innovation networks and about 100 associated social innovation initiatives over a four-year period. The resulting contribution towards the solidification of a theory of TSI, consists of three layers: firstly, the research design and methodology employed; secondly, a relational framework for TSI that articulates four key ‘clusters’ of (inter)relations in TSI processes; and, thirdly, a solidifying and iteratively developed set of theoretical propositions on TSI processes. These propositions articulate the complex and intertwined process-relations of TSI, based on our study of the empirics. The paper ends with an assessment of the contribution of this TSI-theorising, and a discussion of the challenge of further developing TSI theory.
Proposition 1. SI initiatives provide spaces in which new or alternative values can be promoted and aligned with new knowledge and practices —in a process of reflexive experimentation that supports both members' motivations and moves towards collective ‘success’ and ‘impact’. Proposition 2. Manifesting new/alternative interpersonal relations is one pivotal way in which SI actors are able to create the right conditions to challenge, alter, or replace dominant institutions. Proposition 3. People are empowered to persist in their efforts towards institutional change, to the extent that basic needs for relatedness, autonomy, and competence are satisfied, while at the same time experiencing an increased sense of impact, meaning, and resilience. Proposition 4. The transformative impacts of SI initiatives depend greatly on the changing tensions within and stability of the action field(s) that they operate in. Proposition 5. Transnational networks are crucially empowering local SI initiatives. Proposition 6. Discourse formation and its mediation through communication infrastructures crucially enhances the reach of SI network formation. Proposition 7. SI initiatives need to find an institutional home in order to access vital resources; this often entails a balancing against the desire for independence from (critiqued) dominant institutions. Proposition 8. SI initiatives employ a diverse range of strategies for bringing about institutional change; they must proactively adapt these strategies in response to changing circumstances, while navigating contestations with dominant institutions, and maintaining their original vision. Proposition 9. One way in which SI initiatives engage with dominant institutions is by reconsidering the broader institutional logics in which those institutions are embedded; they do this by ‘travelling’ across different institutional logics, and by reinventing, recombining and transposing specific elements. Proposition 10. The rise of SI initiatives and the particular transformative ambitions conveyed by them are strongly shaped by the historical development of the wider sociomaterial context.”
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Source: Mathematical Model Reveals the Patterns of How Innovations Arise
Source: A strategic innovation consultancy informed by embodied cognition, evolutionary theory, new materialism, process philosophy, complexity science, and non-western traditions.
Image: “...how can the self-powering co-evolution in various social sub-systems (Grin et al., 2010), or the important ‘concurrences of multiple change’ (Osterhammel, 2009; Chapter 3) which are required to cause the imminent and already occurring change processes to densify into the ‘great transformation’ that is needed to stabilise the Earth system, and in particular the climate system, be brought about? Figure 6.41 illustrates the paths change agents tend to follow, frequently from the margins of society where unorthodox thinkers and outsiders are at home, out of the so called niches, the birth place of visions of alternative development, through the stages of social communication (agenda setting, objection, opinion leader echo, mass medialisation) into wider innovation networks, then into the social and political mainstream, up to and including the habitualisation of initially marginal attitude patterns and behaviours.” —WBGU, 2011: 261–262