<aside> 💡

AI Summary:

• Climate mitigation scenarios assuming high economic growth rates may be unrealistic and incompatible with Paris Agreement goals.
• Lower growth rates could make it more feasible to reduce emissions in line with 1.5°C-2°C warming targets.
• Post-growth transitions face significant political and cultural challenges, despite potential benefits.
• Degrowth strategies in rich countries may be necessary but currently lack broad societal support.
• Implementing degrowth policies faces obstacles such as potential capital flight and concerns about innovation.
• Structural dependencies and behavioral factors make voluntary large-scale degrowth unlikely.
• As resource constraints intensify, the probability of a large-scale civilizational discontinuity increases.
• Focus should shift to "bracing for impact" and developing resilience strategies at various levels. </aside>

Source: “Existing climate mitigation scenarios assume future rates of economic growth that are significantly higher than what has been experienced in the recent past. In this article we explore how assuming lower rates of growth, in line with the hypothesis of secular stagnation, changes the range of mitigation possibilities. We compare scenarios with moderate and strong policy ambition under both high-growth and low-growth assumptions. The results show that low growth makes it more feasible to decrease emissions in a way that is consistent with 1.5°C–2°C of warming. Moreover, low growth reduces the need to rely on unprecedented buildout of low-carbon energy infrastructure, and the unprecedented rates of energy-GDP decoupling that characterize existing scenarios. By contrast, pursuing higher growth rates, such as those represented in IMF projections, jeapordizes the Paris Agreement. The challenge is that lower growth is commonly associated with recession, which raises concerns about equity between and within countries, social stability, and the ability to finance a low-carbon energy transition. Recent literature on achieving a ‘post-growth’ transition points to novel policies that could address these problems, which should be explored and evaluated in future mitigation scenarios… It should also be acknowledged that the present political outlook is not conducive to such policies, as even the most progressive governments are not contemplating dropping the pursuit of economic growth from their agendas, and redistributive policies within and between nations face substantial obstacles. Post-growth politics may be further complicated by the rise of far-right populism and climate denialism in high-income countries. The political and cultural changes required for post-growth are historically unprecedented and challenging to realize at the pace necessary for staying within 1.5°C–2°C. Post-growth may be as difficult to achieve politically as negative emissions or high energy–GDP decoupling are to develop technically.”

Source: “No doubt the political and economic mainstream—and many ordinary citizens—will see these principles and actions as impossibly radical. Again, however, they are consistent with basic theory and empirical evidence. On its current trajectory, the present system will crash; the corrective throughput reductions suggested above are in line with those of various other technical analyses (Bringezu, 2015; IPCC, 2018; IGES, 2019)... It remains only to ask: what is the probability that in the present 'post-truth' era the leaders of the increasingly fractious world community will be able to come to this or any other shared diagnosis and prescription for what ails the world? Humans are certainly prone to short-sighted self-delusion but are also capable of high intelligence, reason, introspection, compassion and even collective action toward a common goal. Herein, at least, lies possibility (though little latitude for error). These almost uniquely human qualities will have to triumph over primitive instinct, heated emotion and once-successful (but now maladaptive) cultural norms in shaping our collective response to anthropogenic global change."

Source: “A deprioritization of economic growth in policy making in the rich countries will need to be part of a global effort to re-embed economy and society into planetary boundaries. However, societal support for a degrowth transition remains for the time being moderate, and it is not well understood as yet why this is the case. This article argues that Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology can help theorize societal stability and transformational change as well as the preconditions for a degrowth transition. The point of departure is the structure/action debate in sociology highlighting Bourdieu’s middle-ground position. Using his theory of practice, it moves on to analyze the predominating correspondence between structure, habitus, and action as well as the preconditions under which this correspondence may break and result in transformational change. Subsequently, his distinction of ‘doxa,’ ‘orthodoxy,’ and ‘heterodoxy’ is applied to understand possible solutions to the multidimensional crisis of contemporary European societies. The last section addresses Bourdieu’s take on the role that researchers and activists may play during such a transition. The article concludes that in order to facilitate degrowth, formulations of eco-social policy strategies should avoid overburdening people’s experiences and immediate expectations of the future. Deliberative citizen forums can help co-develop and upscale such initiatives as well as broaden their social basis.”

Source: “There are two common arguments against [the implementation of degrowth] interventions that I hear a lot. The first argument suggests that private capital investments might flow to other countries with less stringent regulations and higher profit margins. Politicians argue that these private capital investments are necessary to create jobs, production, consumption, profits, taxes, and debt repayment. Hence, a more favorable economic environment is required to ‘keep the economy competitive.’ Otherwise, if there is no strong international cooperation to prevent capital flight, ‘the economy of a country would be at risk.’ The second argument posits that international industries and corporations are the primary drivers of innovation and efficient use of resources. Again, a more favorable economic environment is preferable. I think both arguments could make sense in the context of increased privatization of essential public goods and resources. However, the pandemic has shown that market competition is neither effective nor efficient for the public well-being. I can also draw from recent experiences in Greece related to the privatization of the energy sector or railway services, which have dramatically failed to deliver on what was promised. Interestingly, the work of Mariana Mazzucato in ‘The Entrepreneurial State’ demonstrates that states often provide essential infrastructure and resources either for free or at minimal cost, thereby subsidizing and fostering innovations and technological advancements utilized by businesses. Hence, these narratives that support the need for private capital investments for economic stability and ‘progress’ could be challenged empirically… we already possess the productive capacity and resources (at least collectively) to produce and provide for Universal Basic Services, Universal Care Income or Job Guarantee, for instance. Instead, the focus may shift towards ecological limitations, and collective, democratic decision-making ought to determine which products and services are to be produced or discontinued, along with the supportive mechanisms needed to facilitate this transition. In my opinion, the implementation of such policies is not solely a matter of feasibility but a matter of political willingness. It requires a political willingness as a society and members of a community to acknowledge that the privileges we may have grown accustomed to should not persist as they come at the cost of social justice and the well-being of the planet. A participatory, social and solidarity economy may hold great relevance in fostering this transformation and willingness mobilization. A deeper culture of democracy, participation, sharing and caring could be cultivated through our everyday socio-economic, socio-ecological and relational practices to build alternative ‘common senses’ (D’Alisa & Kallis, 2020) of being and becoming in common within a finite planet.”

Source: “For many of those who clearly see the path as unsustainable, it may appear that the logical, even advantageous, thing to do would be to reverse course—to reorganize, scale down and ‘de-grow’ our consumptive engine as a carefully managed, preemptive response. We already know that a contraction is looming; dictated not by any of us but by the laws of physics and the imperative of resource constraints. Why not approach de-growth on our terms rather than undergo the disorder of having them imposed upon us? However, this only feeds into the illusion of human control. Unfortunately, our capacity for pre-emptive measures is undermined for reasons both structural and behavioural. Structurally, we did not design our civilisation. It is self-organised. Its dynamic, complex, globalized and integrated structure is both beyond our understanding and our control as it emerged as a response to external resource availability, always expanding to maximize its ability to continue.

Individually or as groups, we may have some potential to have an impact in niches, but those niches do not exist in isolation: they themselves are sustained by the integration with the rest of civilization. Were we to attempt to ‘de-grow’ any given niche by reducing energy and resource inputs, we would encounter an array of destabilizing consequences, some predictable, some not, that would undermine even our ability to exact a meaningful influence on the whole, and even maintain the most basic foundations of human welfare. This reflects the reality that economic and complexity growth are irreversible processes that lock in structural dependencies as they evolve. The past is always with us, just as continually reducing food and fluid inputs will never reverse an adult into a toddler. Seen through a behavioural lens, a few enlightened individuals might opt for ‘voluntary simplicity;’ small groups or communities can and sometimes do work together to reduce their ecological footprint. Yet it is doubtful that any large and complex society will ever voluntarily opt for simplicity and de-growth, as that would entail a series of rather unpleasant choices and equally unpleasant consequences that no nation is equipped to handle while remaining socially and politically stable.

If, by some sort of miracle, a society were to reach somehow the point of maturity, wisdom and harmony required to make such a conscious choice, and if it were to fully accept its consequences and suffer through them in a peaceful way, then no doubt other groups, societies or nations would immediately grab any unused resources either for their own growth or simply to sustain a little longer their deteriorating systems. And, no doubt, parts of such an enlightened society would either jump ship, or try to game the system to push the consequences of de-growth onto others, or openly revolt against the new economic policy. Destined for failure, any ‘enlightened’ change of course would rapidly be overturned.

However, there is also little doubt that the ideas of stopping growth and reversing course will draw increasing appeal, perhaps especially in academic circles, for being one of the few concepts that explicitly goes to the heart of our collective predicament. As society struggles, we can count on a flourishing of books, citations, networking, websites, conferences, movies, and social movements based around promotion of de-growth. For all of their merits, they will most likely have zero impact on reality. There is plenty of precedent: ‘nature conservation,’ ‘sustainable development,’ ‘ecological economics,’ various ‘social justice movements,’ ‘climate mobilizations.’ etc., are all catch phrases with their adherents that have failed, or only marginally influenced the way modern development unfolds. All of them, laudable in their intent, are understandable efforts of the sapient minds to merely grapple with, and somehow effect change in the course of parts of the reality that surrounds them but no significant consequence on the general trajectory.

The implications of growing resource, environmental, and socio-economic stresses, and their interactions through an increasingly vulnerable civilization make a large-scale discontinuity, of collapse, more and more likely. That is, a rapid simplification of the complexity of our system with dramatically reduced capacity to use energy and other resources. We will experience it as a major disruption in the flow of money, goods, services, and resources upon which our societies have become dependent. Therefore, given our manifest inability to change course, we must learn instead to face impending collapse head on, understanding the socio-political environment as we near it and anticipating the major disruptions. We must urgently learn to think like risk managers. We have a declining window of opportunity to set aside false hopes, understand our predicament and begin contingency planning. Wise actions now could have an immense impact on human security in times of severe crisis, and provide us with a firmer sense of how to proceed wisely into the longer future. The most rational approach is to ‘brace for impact’—to install the airbags, train the crews that could inflate them, and to ensure that ambulances are fuelled up and waiting — providing ourselves with maximum life-support capacity during the perilous period of disruption and transition. Or, to use another metaphor: if we know that the ship is going down, then human survival depends not on its course or speed but the quantity and quality of its lifeboats. A design of these has to begin as soon as possible at international, national and local levels, even though those recognizing the need for them are astonishingly few right now.”